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will find frequent references to literary theory, anthropology, philosophy and law, usually presented in a pertinent, coherent and non-pretentious way.
Text and act presents virtually all Taruskin's major writing on performance criticism, beginning with a student piece of 1972 (essay 16), edited with postscripts and a new introduction (some 50 pages) in 1994; there is now no excuse for those who continue to quote Taruskin's views from hearsay, since everything is now conveniently in one place. Seeing the essays together, one marvels at the breadth of material-chapters on Beethoven, Mozart, Bach, Josquin, Busnoys, Monteverdi and Stravinsky, not to speak of copious discussion of theoretical issues.
Of course, there are disadvantages in presenting all the essays together. There is a certain amount of repetition of views and arguments, and a parsimonious editor might well have slimmed the book down somewhat. However, part of the potency of Taruskin's writing is its rhetorical force; some of the repetition actually contributes to the overall argument, by presenting material in slightly different ways. Indeed, the effect is not unlike the rhetorical aspect of music. But, as with musical works, the unity and order of the arguments is often the reader/listener's construction-the book can yield almost as many internal contradictions as coherences, as I shall show later. The basic division of the book into two sections, 'In theory' (essays addressing specific critical issues) and 'In practice' (essays addressing particular performances) makes sense, although there is some degree of overlap between the two, particularly the critique of Nelson Goodman's philosophical definition of the musical work (pp.207f.) which appears in the first chapter of the 'practical' section.
The range of publications from which these essays are drawn is also astonishing: e.g. Taruskin's central argument (most comprehensively stated in essay 4) can be condensed into a diagnosis, a judgement and an axiom: his diagnosis is that very little historical performance is, or can be, truly historical-much has to be invented; that the actual styles of historical performance we hear accord most strikingly with modern taste; that the movement as a whole has all the symptoms of 20th-century modernism, as epitomized by the objectivist, authoritarian Stravinsky in his neoclassical phase. His judgement is not that historical performance practice is intrinsically wrong, rather that it is a true and indeed 'authentic' representation of modernist thinking. (Needless to say, he would prefer it to move in what he sees as the 'postmodernist', 'postauthoritarian' direction.) And the axiom on which much of his work hinges is that the methods on which we base-and by which we judge-scholarship are not those on which we base artistic performance. Each may inform the other, but the one cannot be reduced to the other. Thus the inclusion of a couple of essays addressing the question of editing helps to consolidate one of Taruskin's central points, encapsulated in the title: performance, of any kind, should be an act and not reduced to the status of a text. Performance is significant for its human component and not for its objective veracity.
These central arguments are supported by several other opinions: the 'seductive simplicities of determinism and utopianism have got to be resisted .. and ... the endlessly renegotiated social contract, dowdy patchwork though it be, is the only cause worth defending' (p.192) . This ties in with Taruskin's concern for the audience-an opinion that interestingly seems to grow in the later essays, as he becomes further removed from his performing career-a move from a production-oriented system to a 'proper' reassertion of consumer values (p.47). This development is also shadowed by Taruskin's growing distaste for the concept of Werktreue, something he sees as central to modernist performance (whether 'historical' or 'mainstream') and one that 'inflicts a truly stifling regimen by radically hardening and patrolling what had formerly been a fluid, easily crossed boundary between the performing and composing roles' (p.1o).
His reservations about the work-concept-the idea of individual, fully formed and authoritarian pieces of music-ties in with his distrust of the composer as an authoritarian figure. Many readers, at this stage, might well be led to agree with the popular mythology that Taruskin is fundamentally opposed to the whole enterprise of historical performance. Furthermore, the temporal progression of the essays suggests that he has progressively distanced himself from it (only the earlier writings refer periodically to 'our movement'). But, as his introduction and postscripts to the essays often aver, he believes himself to be continually misrepresented as a crusty opponent to the movement when all he intends to show is its shortcomings. Perhaps part of the problem is that his praise for the movement and his recommendations for its direction are far less strongly argued, most often couched in ambivalent terms and consequently less easy to summarize than his pointed criticisms. Even the historically minded performer Taruskin most respects is treated in a very odd way over the course of the essays: first ( So what constitutes good historical performance for Taruskin? One thing that seems clear is that many performances need to be 'more historical', particularly if the historical evidence implies creative departures from the text, something he demands particularly for the performance of Mozart piano concertos (p.167). He seeks a return to a conception of classical music that began to die out two centuries ago, something that would bring the music closer to the values of pop music than 'classical' (p.170). Another useful comparison, which unfortunately he uses in only one chapter (essay 15), is that between 'crooked' and 'straight' performance. Straight performance is fine 'if what you want out of music is something to sit back and relax to' while the crooked performers are the 'real artists', such as Musica Antiqua Kl61n, whose 'responses are conditioned not by generic demands that can be easily classified ... but by highly specific, unclassifiable, personal and intensely subjective imaginings' (p.317). In short, historically informed performance is all very well provided the 'literalism' (i.e. following of some documentary evidence) is 'inspired':2 Roger Norrington, with his strict adherence to Beethoven's metronome markings; Christopher Page, with his Stravinskyesque approach to 15th-century courtly songs, whose style 'arose out of a fundamental rethinking of the repertory in its specific details, and on as close to its own aesethetic and historical terms as human nature and human epistemics allow, rather than from the acceptance of a standard of beauty or of audience appeal imported unreflectingly from past experience' (p.351); Gustav Leonhardt produces joyful results in Bach performance through 'passionate and committed experiment with original instruments' (p.148); while Nikolaus Harnoncourt refuses to succumb to the customary efforts to prettify and sanitize Bach's severe message in the sacred music (essay 14).
As Taruskin remarks regarding Furtwingler's attitude to performance, it seems that for his own tastes 'anything is all right if it is enough so' (p.242). Retreating somewhat from his insistence that we cannot and should not be slaves to historical evidence, he seems to suggest that we should do precisely this if it causes us to refashion ourselves and produce a performance that is fully committed. As is so often the case, Taruskin's huff and puff reduces to the simple statement that dull performers will use historical evidence dully and inspiring performers will use it inspiringly. But it is probably worth all the huff and puff, since Taruskin's very approach betrays a passionate commitment to the issues. His is the work of an inspired performer. Another conclusion that could be inferred from Taruskin's approach is that everyone concerned with issues that are remotely historical will use history to serve their current needs. In other words, the initially surprising affirmation that historical performance is largely modern make-believe is true insofar as it applies to any historical undertaking, whether written, manufactured or performed. Any seemingly objective account of an event or narrative in history will be a modern construction; what we call historical 'facts' are inevitably ventriloquists' dummies which speak in our voices and with our prejudices. This condition does not, however, render the historical enterprise invalid. It merely restates what we have tacitly known all along: history is useful because it teaches us about ourselves and helps us form our own identities. Thus Taruskin's complaints of passive literalism in the endeavour of historical performance could equally be applied to the entire field of music history, and this is doubtless the direction in which much of his future work will go.
There are two interconnected areas where I take most issue with Taruskin: his desire to 'democratize' performance by catering to the needs and wishes of the audience; and his tendency to promote postmodernism as the answer to all modernism's ills. He introduces the issue of audience satisfaction within his argument that all classical performance is under the grip of the work-concept, all joining 'the ranks of museum curators, with disastrous results-disastrous that is, for the people who pay to hear them' (p.13). Does this imply that there is some standard by which we may test whether or not the audience has had its money's worth, whether or not it has been cheated of some profounder experience?
Things become a little clearer with the next reference, for now Taruskin identifies himself as a member of the audience (this is the non-performer Taruskin Taruskin might also be implying another sense of 'pleasing the audience', one with which I can wholeheartedly concur. This is the idea of the performer taking on something of the audience's role, constantly monitoring the performance from a listener's perspective, and reacting to what he hears. While this is obviously a golden rule for all performance, it might take on a special significance in 'historical' performance as a very practical antidote to a surfeit of factual data. It is precisely this reflexive attitude which is so often a sure sign of quality in visual and musical arts, in which the earliest possible stages of reception are folded back into the creative act.
Taruskin must take credit for being one of the first musicologists to introduce the term 'postmodernism' (in essay 13, of 1987); by the time we get to the 1990s, the term is bandied around by virtually anyone who wants to appear 'relevant' and up-todate. We even get macabre disputes between scholars trying to be 'postmoderner than thou'.4 The fault of this approach is to see postmodernism as the answer to all the evils of modernism, as the way for the future, even as a happy utopia in which all differences will live side-by-side in a pluralistic flux. Taruskin, in his first reference to the term (p.16), tries to erase the utopian element since he directly associates utopia with 'authoritarian fulfillment'. Postmodernism, then, seems to have something to do with the subversion of authority. Next he implies that postmodernism in fact has much to do with 'premodernism', since it revokes the triple nexus (which has grown up since 18oo) of 'serious-classical-work'.5 This is already an odd situation, for however much a postmodernist approach to music (i.e. subversive of musical works) may share with the concepts of music before 18oo, the cultural context in which music is conceived, produced and used is radically different (i.e. feudalism, for the premodern era; it was, ironically, bourgeois 'freedom' that led to the work concept in the first place). So unless Taruskin is prepared to talk about music and its performance in the abstract (absolute music?), divorced from its cultural environment (and I'm sure he's not), the pre/postmodernist association is considerably impoverished.
Later he approvingly quotes a definition of the postmodern stance proffered by two legal scholars, which entails 'rejection either of applause or of de- In short, I would be inclined to side with critics who are sceptical of postmodernism as an ideal (although it is certainly acceptable-indeed useful-as a description of the condition we happen to be in); Terry Eagleton, for instance, sees postmodernism as 'simply co-extensive with the commodification of all life in consumer capitalism ... an aesthetic reflection of already aestheticized images',7 and Christopher Norris quite rightly condemns Jean-Frangois Lyotard's denial of any meaning or truth-value 'aside from the manifold language-games that make up an ongoing cultural conversation', since this allows Lyotard to affirm that there is no certain way of denouncing Faurisson for his assertion that the Nazi Holocaust never really happened-according to Lyotard, 'there is no common ground between Faurisson and those who reject his views'.8 Jirgen Habermas, who sees modernity as an unfinished project, relates postmodernism to the neoconservatives, those who attempt to 'diffuse the explosive content of cultural modernity', a group that 'asserts the pure immanence of art, disputes that it has a utopian content, and points to its illusory character in order to limit the aesthetic experience to privacy. '9 Much of what Taruskin has to say seems to me close to the spirit of Habermas's call for the completion of the Enlightenment: 'What I am after, in a word, is liberation: only when we know something about the sources of our contemporary practices and beliefs, when we know something about the reasons why we do as we do and think as we think, and when we are aware of alternatives, can we in any sense claim to be free in our choice of action and creed, and responsible for it.' (p.19; see, too, the quotation from p.67, above) This, together with numerous criticisms of historical performance's reliance on documented authority and lack of self-resolve, could almost be a paraphrase of the opening of Immanuel Kant's famous essay of 1784, 'What is Enlightenment?'.1o Even the least popular section of Kant's essay-that advocating absolute monarchy over republicanism, strikes a chord with Taruskin's respect for the 'inspired literalism' of those performers who fanatically adhere to a particular historical principle: 'Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, only obey!' Thus to me, Taruskin's advocation of passionate commitment, risk and vision coupled with selfawareness and a sense of choice in performance, and responsibility to both the audience and the richest and deepest possible meanings of pieces of music, could be read as a neo-Enlightenment stance. This posture is inescapably bound to a postmodern condition, to be sure, but it surely should not be confused with the playing superficial surfaces of postmodernism as a conscious movement-one that, more often than not, places the aesthetic in pride of place, above the ethical. Some might already be drawing the conclusion that I object most strongly to the inconsistencies and contradictions in Taruskin's writing; that he demonstrates too many methods of consuming cake. This is and misrepresented, it would seem that he has some notion of an 'authentic' reading of 'Taruskin'. Yet, he clearly admits that his views develop over the years (although he only really mentions the gulf between the student piece of 1972 and the remainder). The author's note at the outset mentions that all essays have been thoroughly re-edited, and that those 'encountering these pieces for the first time need never know what they have been spared.' Taruskin . This is why I feel the performance analogy is useful here (despite Taruskin's reasonable injunction that the fields of performance and scholarship cannot automatically be reduced to one another); the text is so rich in its rhetorical fabric and semantic multivalency that any successful reading has to be as much a 'performance' as a textual exegesis.
At the very least, I hope in my very interpretation to have demonstrated one of Taruskin's central points: that there is no such thing as a literal, single interpretation; that the interpreter needs to engage with the text on a variety of levels, and, most of all, be true to his own beliefs. Of course, insight into the personality and creativity of the original writer are a significant portion of any successful interpretation, particularly if the writing is of any quality, but they are always seen through the eyes of the interpreter; they cannot exist in a neutral objective realm.
